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Abstract. A related-key attack (RKA) occurs when an adversary tam-
pers the private key stored in a cryptographic hardware device and ob-
serves the result of the cryptographic primitive under this modified pri-
vate key. In this paper, we concentrate on the security of anonymous
signcryption schemes under related-key attacks, in the sense that a sign-
cryption system should contain no information that identifies the sender
of the signcryption and the receiver of the message, and yet be decipher-
able by the targeted receiver. To achieve this, we consider our anony-
mous signcryption scheme being semantically secure against chosen ci-
phertext and related-key attacks (CC-RKA), existentially unforgeable
against chosen message and related-key attacks (CM-RKA), and anony-
mous against chosen ciphertext and related-key attacks (ANON-RKA).
Specifically, we require that an anonymous signcryption scheme remains
secure even when an adversary is allowed to access the signcryption or-
acle and the designcryption oracle on linear shifts of the private keys
of the sender and the receiver, respectively. After reviewing some basic
definitions related to our construction, based on the existing work on
cryptographic primitives in the setting of related-key attacks, we give a
concrete anonymous signcryption scheme from BDH which achieves CC-
RKA security, CM-RKA security, ANON-RKA security in the random
oracle model.
Keywords: Signcryption, CC-RKA, CM-RKA, Anonymity.
1 Introduction
In recent decades, physical attacks like side channel attacks [29] that exploit
information leakage from the implementation of an algorithm are becoming in-
creasingly popular and come in a large variety, where an adversary observes some
“physical output” of a computation (such as radiation, power, temperature, run-
ning time), in addition to the “logical output” of the computation. In some of
these situations, the adversary might get some partial information about private
key through certain physical methods, which are referred to as key-leakage at-
tacks. However, such attacks are not anticipated by the designer of the system
and, correspondingly, not taken into account when arguing its security. Since
modern notions of security, such as semantic security [17] and CCA security [30]
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in encryption systems, is formulated in a very desired way that the adversary
can fully control almost all aspects of the system (that is, the adversary is able
to encrypt messages and decrypt ciphertexts at its choice), but have no access
to the private keys of the entities in the communication. Unfortunately, this
assumption is too ideal to satisfy in the above scenarios.
To achieve such security requirements, it requires to capture security under
the context where some information of the private key are leaked to the adver-
sary. In this paper, we consider a special case of such attacks, where an adversary
tampers the private key stored in a cryptographic hardware device and observes
the result of the cryptographic primitive under this modified private key, called
related-key attack (RKA) [16, 8]. The key here could be a signing key of a cer-
tificate authority or a decryption key of an encryption scheme. In related-key
attacks, the adversary attempts to break a cryptographic system by invoking it
with several private keys satisfying some known relations.
Although the RKA security has been achieved in various cryptographic prim-
itives, there are few considering anonymity, which requires that the identities of
participants should not be leaked during the communication [1]. With this in
mind, in this work, we propose an approach for anonymous signcryption secure
against related-key attacks. Suppose the signcryption system is composed of al-
gorithms, public parameters, as well as private and public key pairs of the sender
and the receiver respectively, of which the private and public keys are subject
to related-key attacks, and the public parameters are system-wide, i.e., they are
set beforehand and independent of users. In a protocol run, all these parameters
are possible to be tampered when distributed via a public channel.
For an anonymous signcryption system, the designcryption needs the private
key of the receiver while the signcryption needs the private key of the sender,
hence we consider related-key attacks on private keys of both sides: chosen ci-
phertext attack security under related-key attack (CC-RKA), chosen message
attack security under related-key attack (CM-RKA), as well as anonymity un-
der chosen ciphertext attack and related-key attack (ANON-RKA). The design-
cryption oracle is forbidden when the signcryption is equal to the challenged
signcryption and the derived receiver’s private key matches the original one.
Also, the signcryption oracle will not be executed if the given plaintext is equal
to the challenged plaintext and the derived sender’s private key matches the
original one. Note that we define our model on the basis of the definitions in [7,
8, 33].
To begin with, we need to solve a problem how to designcrypt a signcryp-
tion C with the private key φ(skR), where φ denotes a linear shift. This can be
achieved with key homomorphism [33], which can reduce a signcryption scheme
against related-key attacks with chosen ciphertext attack security and anonymity
to a general chosen ciphertext attack secure and anonymous signcryption scheme
with additional properties that the designcryption of a signcryption C with the
private key φ(skR) equals the designcryption of another signcryption C
′ with
the original private key skR. To consider the security one step further, key ho-
momorphism fails when the signcryption C ′ equals the challenge signcryption
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in the chosen ciphertext attack security and anonymity games. Anyway, with
the adaptive trapdoor relations mentioned in [22, 32, 33], this event will never
happen, which can simply formulate that the challenge signcryption is an invalid
signcryption for any receiver’s private key sk′R 6= skR, such that a valid signcryp-
tion with the public parameters decides a consistent private key uniquely. Next,
we should consider to signcrypt a plaintext m with the private key φ(skS), where
φ denotes a linear shift, yet the case where the plaintext m in the signcryption
C ′ equals the plaintext in the output signcryption where φ(skS) 6= skS . We
adopt a collision resistant hash function in the signcryption, which disables the
adversary to output a valid signcryption for any sender’s private key sk′S 6= skS .
In this way, a valid signcryption with public parameters can only be constructed
by a correct private key.
1.1 Related Work
Signcryption, introduced by Zheng [35] in 1997, is a cryptographic primitive
“Signcryption” to combine the functions of digital signature and encryption in
a single step with a cost lower than that required by signature-then-encryption
approach. In 2002, Baek, Steinfeld, and Zheng [5] formalized and defined secu-
rity notions for signcryption, which are similar to the chosen ciphertext attack
security and chosen message attack security. The notion was first defined by Jee
Hea An, Yevgeniy Dodis, Tal Rabin [3], where an adversary not only access the
public keys of both the sender and the receiver but also know the private key of
the sender, which later was extended to the security properties of signcryption
[28, 25]. Malone-Lee [28] proposed the first identity-based signcryption scheme,
and claimed that their scheme achieves both privacy and unforgeability. Libert
and Quisquater [25] pointed out that the scheme in [28] is not semantically se-
cure in privacy as the signature of the message is not hidden in the signcrypted
message, and proposed a signcryption scheme with ciphertext anonymity [26]
based on gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, but Yang, Wong and Deng [34] found
that it is not secure. Chow et al. [15] designed an identity-based signcryption
scheme with public verifiability and forward security. Concurrently, Boyen [14]
extended the security model in [28] via adding three new security notions: ci-
phertext unlinkability, ciphertext authentication and ciphertext anonymity. In
addition, there are also some works concentrating on efficiency [6, 23, 24]. Bar-
reto et al. [6] constructed an identity-based signcryption scheme which greatly
improves the efficiency. Chung et al. [23] described a key privacy preserving sign-
cryption scheme with high efficiency and simple design, and then they extended
it to a ring signcryption scheme based on the technique due to Boneh et al. [13].
In 2004, Micali and Reyzin [29] put forward a comprehensive framework for
modeling security against side-channel attacks, which relies on the assumption
that there is no leakage of information in absence of computation. Halderman
et al. [19] in 2008 described a set of attacks violating the assumption of the
framework of Micali and Reyzin. Specially speaking, their “cold boot” attacks
showed that a significant fraction of the bits of a cryptographic key can be recov-
ered if the key is ever stored in memory, of which the framework was modeled by
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Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan [2]. Similarly, fault injection techniques
can be used to falsify, inducing the internal state of the devices being modified,
if given physical access to the hardware devices [11]. Bellare and Kohno [9] in-
vestigated related-key attacks from a theoretical point of view and presented
an approach to formally handle the notion of related-key attacks. Followed the
approach in [9], Lucks [27] presented some constructions for block ciphers and
pseudorandom function generators. To solve the open problem in related-secret
security whether or not related-key secure blockciphers exist, in 2010, Bellare
and Cash [7] provided the first constructions to create related-secret pseudoran-
dom bits. On the basis of the work in [7], Applebaum, Harnik, and Ishai [4] put
forward some RKA secure symmetric encryption schemes, which can be used in
garbled circuits in secure computation. In [8], Bellare, Cash and Miller found
the approaches to build high-level primitives secure against related-key attacks
like signatures, CCA secure public-key encryption, identity-based encryption,
based on RKA secure pseudorandom functions. So far, efforts have been made
to achieve RKA security about cryptographic systems such as signatures [18,
10], CCA secure public-key encryption [33, 10], identity-based encryption [10],
in the setting of related-key deriving function being a class of constant functions,
linear functions, affine functions, and polynomial functions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
present the concepts associated to this work and our defined security model
of RKA secure signcryption. In Section 3, we review the bilinear pairs and the
complexity assumptions. In Section 4, we propose a specific construction of RKA
secure signcryption from BDH, and prove its security in the random oracle model.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Firstly, we briefly describe the framework of signcryption, and some concepts
related to RKA security. Then we details the security definitions of signcryption
schemes with anonymity in the setting of related-key attacks.
2.1 Signcryption
Let M be the message space. An signcryption scheme is composed of the fol-
lowing four algorithms [24]: Setup, Keygen, Signcrypt, Designcrypt.
– Setup(1λ)→ params: Taking a security parameter λ as input, this algorithm
outputs the public parameters params.
– Keygen(1λ, params) → (skR, pkR),(skS , pkS): Taking a security parameter
λ and the public parameters params as input, this algorithm outputs two
private and public key pairs (skR, pkR), (skS , pkS).
– Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, skS , pkR) → C: Taking a security parameter λ,
the public parameters params, a plaintext m ∈M, the private key skS and
the public key pkR as input, this algorithm outputs a signcryption C.
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– Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, skR, pkS)→ m/⊥: Taking a security parameter
λ, the public parameters params, a signcryption C, the private key skR,
and the public key pkS as input, this algorithm first computes a message
and signature pair (m, σ) with skR, and checks its validity with pkS . Then
it outputs either m ∈ M for a valid signcryption, or ⊥ in case of a invalid
signcryption.
We require that a signcryption system is correct, meaning that if params ←
Setup(1λ), (skR, pkR),(skS , pkS)←Keygen(1λ, params) and C← Signcrypt(1λ,
params, m, skS , pkR), then m ← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, skR, pkS).
2.2 RKA Security
Related-key deriving functions. Our definition follows the notion of related-
key deriving functions given in [9]. Briefly speaking, a class Φ of related-key
deriving functions φ: sku → sku is a finite set of functions with the same domain
and range, which map a key to a related key. Additionally, Φ should allow an
efficient membership test, and φ should be efficiently computable. Note that in
this paper, we only consider the class Φ+ as linear shifts.
The family Φ+. Any function φ : Z∗q → Z∗q in this class is indexed by 4 ∈ Z∗q ,
where φ4(sku) : = sku +4.
Informally, we consider a secure anonymous signcryption scheme against
related-key attacks to be semantically secure against chosen ciphertext and
related-key attacks (CC-RKA), existentially unforgeable against chosen message
and related-key attacks (CM-RKA), and anonymous against related-key attacks
in the sense that a signcryption should contain no information that identifies the
sender of the signcryption and the receiver of the message (ANON-RKA), and
yet be decipherable by the targeted receiver.
CC-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against
chosen ciphertext and related-key attacks (CC-RKA security) if no probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantages in the following
game.
– Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1k), and
(skR, pkR),(skS , pkS)← Keygen(1λ, params). Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the private and public key pair (skS , pkS), and the
public key pkR to the adversary algorithm A.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a series of queries to RKA.Designcrypt oracle.
On input a signcryption C, and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ, algo-
rithm B runs (m, σ)← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, φ(skR)), and sends (m,
σ) to algorithm A. Note that as skS is given to algorithm A, we remove the
queries to RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
– Challenge. Algorithm A outputs two messages M∗0 , M∗1 ∈M, |M∗0 | = |M∗1 |,
on which it wishes to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses a random d ∈
{0, 1}, and runs C∗ ← Signcrypt(1λ, params, md, skS , pkR). Algorithm B
sends C∗ as the designcryption to algorithm A.
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– Phase 2. AlgorithmA continues to adaptively issue queries to RKA.Designcrypt
oracle. On input a signcryption C, and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ,
with the constraint (φ(skR), C) 6= (skR, C∗), algorithm B responds as in
Phase 1.
– Output. Algorithm A outputs its guess d′ ∈ {0, 1} for d and wins the game
if d′ = d.
We define algorithm A’s advantage in this game to be
AdvCC-RKAA (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′]− 1/2|.
CM-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable
against chosen message and related-key attacks (CM-RKA security) if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantages in the fol-
lowing game.
– Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1k), and
(skR, pkR),(skS , pkS)← Keygen(1λ, params). Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the private and public key pair (skR, pkR), and the
public key pkS to the adversary algorithm A.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a series of queries to RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
On input a message m ∈ M, and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ,
algorithm B runs C ← Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, φ(skS), pkR), and sends
C to algorithm A. Note that as skR is given to algorithm A, we remove the
queries to RKA.Designcrypt oracle.
– Output. Algorithm A outputs a signcryption C∗, and wins the game if (m∗,
σ∗) ← Designcrypt(1λ, params, C∗, skR), and true ← Verify(1λ, params,
m∗, σ∗).
ANON-RKA Security. A signcryption scheme is anonymous against cho-
sen ciphertext and related-key attacks (ANON-RKA security) if no probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversary has a non-negligible advantages in the following
game.
– Initialization. The challenger algorithm B runs params ← Setup(1k), and
(skR,0, pkR,0),(skS,0, pkS,0) ← Keygen(1λ, params), (skR,1, pkR,1),(skS,1,
pkS,1) ← Keygen(1λ, params), respectively. Algorithm B gives the public
parameters params, the private and public key pairs (skS,0, pkS,0), (skS,1,
pkS,1), and the public keys pkR,0, pkR,1 to the adversary algorithm A.
– Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a series of queries to RKA.Designcrypt oracle.
On input skS ∈ {skS,0, skS,1}, pkR ∈ {pkR,0, pkR,1}, a signcryption C,
and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ, algorithm B runs (m, σ) ←
Designcrypt(1λ, params, C, φ(skR)), and sends (m, σ) to algorithm A.
Note that as skS,0, skS,1 are given to algorithm A, we remove the queries to
RKA.Signcrypt oracle.
– Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗ ∈ M on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random d, e ∈ {0, 1}, and runs C∗
← Signcrypt(1λ, params, m, skS,d, pkR,e). Algorithm B sends C∗ as the
designcryption to algorithm A.
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– Phase 2. AlgorithmA continues to adaptively issue queries to RKA.Designcrypt
oracle. On input skS ∈ {skS,0, skS,1}, pkR ∈ {pkR,0, pkR,1}, a signcryption
C, and a related-key deriving function φ ∈ Φ, with the constraint (φ(skR,d),
C) 6= (skR,d, C∗), algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
– Output. Algorithm A outputs its guess d′, e′ ∈ {0, 1} for d, e, and wins the
game if d′ = d and e′ = e.
We define algorithm A’s advantage in this game to be
AdvANON-RKAA (λ)
def
= |Pr[d = d′ ∧ e = e′]− 1/4|.
3 Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we review a few facts related to groups with efficiently computable
bilinear maps, and the security assumptions that our new schemes based on.
3.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q. Let g be
a generator of G, and ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map with the following
properties [12, 20, 21]: (1) Bilinear: for all g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have ê(ga, gb)
= ê(g, g)ab; (2) Non-degenerate: ê(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed
efficiently and there exists a group GT and an efficiently computable bilinear
map ê : G×G→ GT as above.
3.2 Complexity Assumptions
Computational DL. The computational Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is
that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to compute b
given (g, gb), where g ∈ G, b ∈ Z∗q are chosen independently and uniformly at
random.
Computational BDH. The computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) prob-
lem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to
compute ê(g, g)abc given (g, ga, gb, gc), where g ∈ G, a, b, c ∈ Z∗q are chosen
independently and uniformly at random.
Decisional BDH. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem is
that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to distinguish
(g, ga, gb, gc, ê(g, g)abc) from (g, ga, gb, gc, Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ GT , a, b,
c ∈ Z∗q are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
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4 Anonymous Signcryption from RKA Security
In this section, we propose a specific anonymous signcryption scheme in the
setting of related-key attacks, and analyze its CC-RKA, CM-RKA and ANON-
RKA security.
4.1 Techniques in Our Solution
To achieve key homomorphism [33], we make use of a class of functions with an
additional input (namely tag), called adaptive trapdoor relations [22, 32], which
is easy to compute and invert with tag, but hard to invert without tag.
More specifically, our adaptive trapdoor relation Fpku satisfies the following
features.
– Generation. This is a randomized algorithm G that outputs a pair (pku, sku)
on input a security parameter λ.
– Sampling. On input pku and tag, this randomized algorithm F outputs (θ,
Fpku(tag , θ)) for a random θ.
– Inversion. For all tag, y and (pku, sku), this efficient algorithm F
′ computes
F ′(sku, tag , y) = F
−1
pku
(tag , y).
– One-wayness. For a stateful adversary A, it holds that
Pr
θ = θ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
tag∗ ← A(1λ).
(pku, sku)← G(1λ).
(θ, y)← F (pku, tag∗).
θ′ ← AF
−1
pku
(·,·)(pku, y).

is a negligible function in λ, where adversary A is allowed to query F−1pku(·, ·)
on any tag different from tag∗.
Key Homomorphism. Let Φ be a set of related-key deriving functions. We
say that Fpku is Φ-key homomorphic if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm T such that F ′(φ(sku), tag, y) = F
′(sku, tag, T (φ, tag, y)) holds with
overwhelming probability for all φ ∈ Φ, sku, tag and y.
4.2 Construction
Let ê : G × G → GT be a bilinear map over a bilinear group G of prime order
q with a generator g ∈ G. The scheme is described as follows.
– Setup. To generate the system public parameters, this algorithm works as
follows.
1. Chooses random β, γ ∈ Z∗q , and computes g1 = gβ , g2 = gγ .
2. Chooses collision resistant hash functions H0 : G
2 → G, H : G2 → Z∗q ,
H ′ : G5 ×G2T → Z∗q .
3. Outputs the public parameters (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′).
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– Keygen. To generate two private and public key pairs for receiver R and
sender S respectively, the system chooses random xR, xS ∈ Z∗q as the private
keys, and computes YR = g
xR , YS = g
xS as the public keys.
– Signcrypt. To signcrypt a message m ∈ GT for receiver R, sender S runs as
follows.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗q , and computes µ = gr, θ = g1r.
2. Chooses a random e ∈ Z∗q , and computes tag = ge.
3. Computes ψ = ê(θ, g2) ·m, and
τ = (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r ·H0(µ, YRr),
σ = e− xS ·H ′(µ, τ, ψ, YRr, YRxS , tag,m),
4. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ).
– Designcrypt. To designcrypt a signcrypiton C from sender S, receiver R runs
as follows.
1. Computes θ as θ = ( τH0(µ,µxR ) · µ
−xR)
1
H(µ,tag) . If ê(θ, g) = ê(µ, g1), com-
putes m = ψ/ê(θ, g2), and outputs (µ, τ , ψ, m, tag, σ). Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
2. Check the validity of σ via tag = gσ · YSH
′(µ,τ,ψ,µxR ,YS
xR ,tag,m). If the
equation holds, it outputs m. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
4.3 Proof of Security
We analyze the security of our proposed signcryption scheme against related-key
attacks by reducing its CC-RKA security, CM-RKA security, and ANON-RKA
security under the security games defined in Section 2.
Theorem 1. Assume that the decisional BDH assumption holds in G,GT , the
computational BDH problem holds in G,GT , then our signcryption scheme is
CC-RKA secure regarding linear related-key deriving functions φ+ in the random
oracle model.
Let (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗) be the challenge signcryption of the message Md
given to algorithm A by algorithm B. Denote Failure by the event that algorithm
A issues (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M0) or (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M1) to random oracle
H ′, and (µ, Y1) to random oracle H0, where ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, µ
∗).
In what follows we prove that if the event Failure does not occur, then our
signcryption scheme is CC-RKA secure. We conclude this proof by showing that
the event Failure has a negligible probability to occur.
Lemma 1. If the decisional BDH assumption holds in G,GT , and the event
Failure does not happen, then our signcryption scheme is CC-RKA secure.
Proof. Suppose that algorithm A is an adversary algorithm against the CC-RKA
security of our signcrypiton scheme, then we can construct a challenger algorithm
B that solves the decisional BDH problem, which is given input a BDH instance
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(g, ga, gb, gc, Z) and outputs 1 (Z is ê(g, g)abc) or 0 (Z is a random element in
GT ).
Initialization. To simulate the system parameters, algorithm B runs as follows.
1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G2 → Z∗q .
2. Chooses a random e∗ ∈ Z∗q , computes tag∗ = ge
∗
.
3. Chooses a random xS ∈ Z∗q , computes computes YS = gxS .
4. Chooses a random xr ∈ Z∗q , computes YR = (gb)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr . Note that
xR = logg YR = −b ·H(gc, tag∗) + xr is unknown to algorithm B.
5. Sends the public parameters (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′) of which g1 = g
b, g2 = g
a,
H0, H
′ are the random oracles controlled by algorithm B, receiver R’s public
key YR, and sender S’s public and private key pair (xS , YS) to algorithm A.
H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, Y1).
Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is initially
empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on Y , algorithm B responds as
follows.
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds with H0(µ, Y1).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗q , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti, and
adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B responds as follows.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds
with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗q , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, M),
si) to list LH′ .
Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to
algorithm B. For a query (C, φ) to RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ ,
ψ, tag, σ), algorithm B responds as follows.
1. Algorithm B computes θ′ with φ(xR). To see how algorithm B obtains θ
without xR, we rewrite τ such that
τ
ti
= (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r = µ−b·H(g
c,tag∗)+xr+b·H(µ,tag)
= (µb)H(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr = θH(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
⇒ θ = ( τ
ti · µxr
)
1
H(µ,tag)−H(gc,tag∗) .
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On the other hand,
θ′ = (
τ
ti
· µ−(xR+4))
1
H(µ,tag) = ((
τ
ti
· µ−4) · µ−xR)
1
H(µ,tag)
= θ · (µ−4)
1
H(µ,tag) .
Note that this reflects how key homomorphism works in the adaptive trap-
door relation [33].
2. If ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1), algorithm B outputs m = ψ/ê(θ′, g2). Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
Challenge. AlgorithmA outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B chooses random s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗q , a random d ∈ {0, 1},
sets µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ∗ = (gc)xr · t∗, ψ∗ = Z ·Md, σ∗ = e∗ − xS · s∗.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, YR
c, YR
xS , Md), s
∗) to list LH′ , ((µ, YR
c), t∗) to list LH0 .
Phase 2. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to
algorithm B. For a query (C, φ) to RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ ,
ψ, tag, σ), algorithm B responds as follows.
– H(µ, tag) 6= H(gc, tag∗). Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, σ) 6= (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, σ∗). If algorithm
B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A breaks the security of the
CM-RKA security of our scheme, which we will analyze later. Therefore,
algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) 6= xR.
If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A can output
φ ∈ Φ such that ( τ
∗
t∗ · (µ
∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) 6= ⊥. That is, ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1),
to guarantee this,
(
τ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−xR)
1
H(gc,tag∗) = (
τ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) ⇒ xR = φ(xR)
should hold. Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible prob-
ability.
In fact this is the one-wayness property of the adaptive trapdoor relation,
which on the other hand reflects how the key fingerprint property, which
is indispensable according to the definitions given in [7, 4, 33], works in our
construction.
Note that (C, φ) satisfying H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗,
τ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) = xR, is not allowed by the definition of the CC-RKA
security game.
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Output. Algorithm A outputs a guess d′ ∈ {0, 1}. If d = d′, algorithm A
wins the game, and algorithm B outputs 1 indicating Z = ê(g, g)abc. Otherwise,
algorithm B outputs 0 indicating Z is random in GT .
Let ε be the advantage that algorithm A breaks the CC-RKA security of
the above game. We can see that if algorithm B’s input tuple is (g, ga, gb, gc,
Z) where Z = ê(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s view of this simulation is identical
to the real attack, thus algorithm A’s probability in outputting d′ = d must
satisfy Pr[d = d′] = 1/2 + ε. On the other hand, if algorithm B’s input tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, Z) where Z ∈ GT , then algorithm A’s advantage is nil and thus
Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2. To sum up, algorithm B’s probability in solving the decisional
BDH problem is
Pr[B(g, ga, gb, gc, Z)] = 1/2 · (1/2 + ε) + 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/2 + ε/2.
In the following, we prove that the event Failure has a negligible probability
to occur due to the security of the computational DH problem hiding in hash
function H ′.
Lemma 2. If the computational BDH problem holds in G,GT , then the event
Failure happens with a negligible probability.
Proof. Given algorithm A for which the event Failure happens with a noticeable
probability, we construct an algorithm B′ that solves the computational BDH
problem. Specifically, we consider the following game where algorithm B′ solves
the computational BDH problem. Suppose that algorithm B′ is given a random
tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) as input and outputs ê(g, g)abc.
Initialization. The same as in Lemma 1.
H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, Y1).
Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is initially
empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on (µ, Y1), algorithm B responds
as follows.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, g
c), algorithm B solves the computational BDH problem
immediately. To see this, we have
Y1 = YR
c = (gbc)−H(g
c,tag∗)gc·xr
⇒ gbc = ( Y1
gc·xr
)−
1
H(gc,tag∗) ⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(ga, gbc).
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds with H0(µ, YR
r).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗q , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti, and
adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
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Y1, Y2, tag, m), Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ, ψ, Y1, Y2, tag,m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B responds as follows.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, g
c), the same as that in H0 query.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds
with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗q , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m),
si) to list LH′ .
Phase 1. The same as in Lemma 1.
Challenge. AlgorithmA outputs two messages M0, M1 ∈ GT on which it wishes
to be challenged. Algorithm B′ chooses random r∗, s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗q , and computes
µ∗ = gr
∗
, τ∗ = (YR · g1H(µ
∗,tag∗))r
∗
· t∗,
ψ∗ = ê(g1, g2)
r∗ ·Md, σ∗ = e∗ − xS · s∗,
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, YR
r∗ , YR
xS , tag∗, Md), s
∗) to list LH′ , (YR
r∗ , t∗) to list LH0 .
Phase 2. The same as in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 makes sure that as long as the event Failure does not happen,
then our signcryption scheme preserves CC-RKA security. Lemma 2 guarantees
that as long as the event Failure does not happen, algorithm B′ is the same as
algorithm B such that algorithm A cannot differentiate between algorithm B
and algorithm B′.
This completes the proof of CC-RKA security of our signcryption scheme.
Theorem 2. Assume that the computational DL problem holds in G, then our
signcryption scheme is CM-RKA secure regarding linear related-key deriving
functions φ+ in the random oracle.
Proof. Suppose that algorithm A is an adversary breaks the CM-RKA security of
our signcrypiton scheme, we construct algorithm B that solves the computational
DL problem which is given input a random tuple (g, gb) and outputs b.
Initialization. To simulate the system parameters, algorithm B runs as follows.
1. Chooses collision resistant hash functions H0 : G
2 → G, H : G2 → Z∗q ,
2. Chooses a random a ∈ Z∗q , computes g2 = ga, and then chooses a random
xR ∈ Z∗q , computes YR = gxR , and a random xs ∈ Z∗q , computes YS = (gb)xs .
Note that xS = logg YS = b · xs, which is unknown to algorithm B.
3. Sends the public parameters (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′) of which g1 = g
b, where
H ′ is a random oracle controlled by algorithm B, receiver R’s public and
private key pair (xR, YR), and sender S’s public key YS to algorithm A.
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H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B responds as follows.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds
with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗q , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m),
si) to list LH′ .
Phase 1. Algorithm A adaptively issues the RKA signcryption queries to algo-
rithm B. Once algorithm A queries (m, φ) to RKA.Signcrypt oracle, algorithm
B responds as follows.
1. Chooses a random r ∈ Z∗q , and computes µ = gr.
2. Chooses random σ, si ∈ Z∗q , and computes tag = gσ · YS
si , τ = (YR ·
g1
H(µ,tag))r ·H0(µ, YRr), and ψ = ê(g1r, g2) ·m.
3. Outputs the signcryption C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ), and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, YR
r,
YR
xS+4, tag, m), si) to list LH′ .
Output. Algorithm A outputs a signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and
algorithm B designcrypts it following the designcryption algorithm. If this is a
valid signcryption, from the Forking Lemma in [31], after a polynomial replay
attack of algorithm A, we obtain two valid signcryption (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗)
and (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ) with si 6= s∗, from which we have
tag∗ = gσ
∗
· YSs
∗
= gσ · YSsi ⇒ YS = g
σ−σ∗
s∗−si ⇒ b = σ − σ
∗
xs · (s∗ − si)
.
That is, algorithm B solves the computational DL problem.
This completes the proof of CM-RKA security of our signcryption scheme.
Theorem 3. Assume that the computational BDH assumption holds in G,GT ,
then our signcryption scheme is ANON-RKA secure regarding linear related-key
deriving functions φ+ in the random oracle model.
Proof. This part is similar to that of Theorem 1. Denote Failure by the event
that algorithm A issues (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M∗) to random oracle H ′, and (µ,
Y1) to random oracle H0, where ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR, µ
∗). We firstly prove that if the
event Failure does not occur, our signcryption scheme is ANON-RKA secure;
then conclude it by that the event Failure has a negligible probability to occur.
Suppose there is an adversary algorithm A against the anonymity of our
RKA secure signcryption scheme. We construct a challenge algorithm B that
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solves the computational BDH problem, which is given a random tuple (g, ga,
gb, gc) as input and outputs Z = ê(g, g)abc.
Initialization. To simulate the system parameters, algorithm B runs as follows.
1. Chooses a collision resistant hash function H : G2 → Z∗q .
2. Chooses a random e∗ ∈ Z∗q , computes tag∗ = ge
∗
.
3. Chooses random xS,0, xS,1 ∈ Z∗q , computes YS,0 = gxS,0 , YS,1 = gxS,1 .
4. Chooses random xr,0, xr,1 ∈ Z∗q , computes YR,0 = (gb)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr,0 , YR,1
= (gb)−H(g
c,tag∗)gxr,1 .
5. Sends (g, g1, g2, H0, H, H
′, (xS,0, YS,0), (xS,0, YS,1), YR,0, YR,1) to algorithm
A, where g1 = gb, g2 = ga, H0, H ′ are the random oracles controlled by
algorithm B.
H0-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, Y1).
Algorithm B maintains a list LH0 of tuples ((µ, Y1), H0(µ, Y1)) which is initially
empty. When algorithm A issues a hash query on (µ, Y1), algorithm B responds
as follows.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR,e, g
c) for e ∈ {0, 1}, algorithm B solves the computational
BDH problem immediately. To see this, we have
Y1 = YR,e
c = (gbc)−H(g
c,tag∗)gc·xr
⇒ gbc = ( Y1
gc·xr
)−
1
H(gc,tag∗) ⇒ ê(g, g)abc = ê(ga, gbc).
– If (µ, Y1) already appears in list LH0 , algorithm B responds with H0(µ, Y1).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random ti ∈ Z∗q , sets H0(µ, Y1) = ti, and
adds ((µ, Y1), ti) to list LH0 .
H ′-query. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on (µ, τ , ψ,
Y1, Y2, tag, m). Algorithm B maintains a list LH′ of tuples ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m), H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m)) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m), algorithm B responds as follows.
– If ê(Y1, g) = ê(YR,e, g
c) for e ∈ {0, 1}, the same as that in H0 query.
– If (µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m) already appears in list LH′ , algorithm B responds
with H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m).
– Otherwise, algorithm B chooses a random si ∈ Z∗q , sets H ′(µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2,
tag, m) = si, sends si to algorithm A, and adds ((µ, τ , ψ, Y1, Y2, tag, m),
si) to list LH′ .
Phase 1. Algorithm A chooses (xS , YR), where xS ∈ {xS,0, xS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to algorithm B.
For a query (C, φ) to RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ),
algorithm B responds as follows.
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1. Algorithm B computes θ′ with φ(xR). To see how algorithm B obtains θ
without xR, we rewrite τ such that
τ
ti
= (YR · g1H(µ,tag))r = µ−b·H(g
c,tag∗)+xr+b·H(µ,tag)
= (µb)H(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr = θH(µ,tag)−H(g
c,tag∗) · µxr
⇒ θ = ( τ
ti · µxr
)
1
H(µ,tag)−H(gc,tag∗) .
On the other hand,
θ′ = (
τ
ti
· µ−(xR+4))
1
H(µ,tag) = ((
τ
ti
· µ−4) · µ−xR)
1
H(µ,tag)
= θ · (µ−4)
1
H(µ,tag) .
2. If ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1), algorithm B outputs m = ψ/ê(θ′, g2). Otherwise, it
outputs ⊥.
Challenge. Algorithm A outputs a message M∗ ∈ GT on which it wishes to be
challenged. Algorithm B chooses random s∗, t∗ ∈ Z∗q , d, e ∈ {0, 1}, Z ∈ GT , sets
µ∗ = gc, and computes
τ∗ = (gc)xr,e · t∗, ψ∗ = Z ·M∗, σ∗ = e∗ − xS,d · s∗.
Algorithm B outputs the signcryption C∗ = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, tag∗, σ∗), and adds
((µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, (YR,e)
c, YR,e
xS,d , tag∗, M∗), s∗) to list LH′ , ((g
c, (YR,e)
c), t∗) to
list LH0 .
Phase 2. Algorithm A chooses (xS , YR), where xS ∈ {xS,0, xS,1}, YR ∈ {YR,0,
YR,1}, and adaptively issues the RKA designcryption queries to algorithm B.
For a query (C, φ) to RKA.Designcrypt oracle where C = (µ, τ , ψ, tag, σ),
algorithm B responds as follows.
– H(µ, tag) 6= H(gc, tag∗). Algorithm B responds as in Phase 1.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), and (µ, τ , ψ, σ) 6= (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, σ∗). If algorithm
B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A breaks the security of the
CM-RKA security of our scheme. Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except
with negligible probability.
– H(µ, tag) = H(gc, tag∗), (µ, τ , ψ, σ) = (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, σ∗) and φ(xR) 6= xR.
If algorithm B accepts this signcryption, it means algorithm A can output
φ ∈ Φ such that ( τ
∗
t∗ · (µ
∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) 6= ⊥. That is, ê(θ′, g) = ê(µ, g1).
To guarantee this,
(
τ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−xR)
1
H(gc,tag∗) = (
τ∗
t∗
· (µ∗)−φ(xR))
1
H(gc,tag∗) ⇒ xR = φ(xR)
should hold. Therefore, algorithm B outputs ⊥ except with negligible prob-
ability.
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Analysis. Algorithm A has negligible probability to issue (gc, Y1) to random
oracle H0 such that ê(Y1, g) = ê(g
c, YR,e) for e ∈ {0, 1}. If so, algorithm B can
solve the computational BDH problem immediately. On the other hand, without
the value of H0(µ, YR,e
c), algorithm A has no idea about the identity of receiver
R from the challenge signcryption C∗. Likewise, algorithm A has negligible prob-
ability to issue (µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, Y1, Y2, M
∗) to random oracle H ′ such that ê(Y1, g)
= ê(gc, YR,e); otherwise, algorithm B can solve the computational BDH problem
immediately. Obviously, without the value of H ′(µ∗, τ∗, ψ∗, YR,e
c, YR,e
xS,d ,M∗),
algorithm A cannot distinguish the identity of sender S from the challenge sign-
cryption C∗ via verification.
This completes the proof of ANON-RKA security of our signcryption scheme.
5 Conclusions
With the development of information technology, there has been a great interest
in anonymous systems. On the other hand, traditional security notions cannot
meet the requirements in the scenarios where the adversaries might get some
partial information about private keys through certain physical methods. Mo-
tivated by the above, following the work in [8, 33], in this paper, we focus on
the construction of anonymous signcryption schemes secure against related-key
attacks. We put forward a specific anonymous signcryption scheme from BDH
under the setting of related-key attacks, where an adversary can subsequently
observe the outcome of the signcryption and designcryption algorithms under
a series of modified private keys of the sender and the receiver (related to the
original private keys of the sender and the receiver), respectively. On the basis
of the work in [10, 33], we define the security model for anonymous signcryption
systems which can resist related-key attacks while maintaining chosen ciphertext
attack security (CC-RKA security), chosen message attack security (CM-RKA
security) and anonymity, in the sense that a signcryption should contain no in-
formation that identifies the sender of the signcryption and the receiver of the
message (ANON-RKA), where an adversary is allowed to issue queries to design-
cryption oracle on linear shifts of the private key of the receiver, and signcryption
oracle on linear shifts of the private key of the sender.
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